We suggest a candidate one-way function using combinatorial constructs such as expander graphs. These graphs are used to determine a sequence of small overlapping subsets of input bits, to which a hard-wired random predicate is applied. Thus, the function is extremely easy to evaluate: all that is needed is to take multiple projections of the input bits, and to use these as entries to a look-up table. It is feasible for the adversary to scan the look-up table, but we believe it would be infeasible to nd an input that ts a given sequence of values obtained for these overlapping projections.
Introduction
In contrary to the present attempts to suggest a practical private-key encryption scheme in place of the des, we believe that attempts should focus on suggesting practical one-way functions and pseudorandom functions. Being a simpler object, one-way functions should be easier to construct, and such constructions may later yield directly or indirectly a variety of other applications (including private-key encryption schemes).
The current attempts to suggest a practical private-key encryption scheme in place of the des seem quite ad-hoc: not only that they cannot be reduced to any well-known problem, but (typically) they do not relate to a computational problem of natural appeal. Thus, the study of these suggestions is of limited appeal (especially from a conceptual point of view).
In this manuscript, we propose a general scheme for constructing one-way functions. We do not believe that the complexity of inverting the resulting function follows from some well-known intractability assumptions. We believe that the complexity of inverting this function is a new interesting open problem, and hope that other researcher will be able to obtain better understanding of this problem.
In addition to the abstract presentation, we propose several concrete instantiations of our proposal. It seems to us that a reasonable level of \security" (i.e., hardness to invert) may be achieved at very modest input lengths. Speci cally, on input length at the order of a couple of hundreds of bits, inverting the function may require complexity (e.g., time) beyond 2 100 .
Style and Organization: This write-up is intended to two di erent types of readers: researchers in the the area of computational complexity as well as researchers interested in the practice of cryptography. Consequently, we provide an asymptotic presentation coupled with suggestions for concrete parameters. The basic suggestion is presented in Sections 2 and 3. Concrete instantiations of this suggestion are proposed in Section 4. Concluding comments appear in Section 5.
The Basic Suggestion
We construct a (uniform) collection of functions ff n : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g n g n2N . Our construction utilizes a collection of`(n)-subsets, S 1 ; :::; S n n] def = f1; :::; ng, and a predicate P : f0; 1g`( n) ! f0; 1g. Jumping ahead, we hint that:
1. The function`is relatively small: Theoretically speaking,`= O(log n) or even`= O(1).
In practice`should be in the range f7; :::; 16g, whereas n should range between a couple of hundreds and a couple of thousands.
2. We prefer to have P : f0; 1g`! f0; 1g be a random predicate. That is, it will be randomly selected, xed, and \hard-wired" into the function. For sure, P should not be linear, nor depend on few of its bit locations. 3. The collection S 1 ; :::; S n should be expanding: speci cally, for some k, every k subsets should cover at least k + (n) elements of f1; :::; ng. The complexity of the inversion problem (for f n constructed based on such a collection) seems to be exponential in the \net expansion" of the collection (i.e., the cardinality of the union minus the number of subsets). For x = x 1 x n 2 f0; 1g n and S n], where S = fi 1 ; i 2 ; :::; i t g and i j < i j+1 , we denote by x S the projection of x on S; that is, x S = x i 1 x i 2 x it . Fixing P and S 1 ; :::; S n as above, we de ne f n (x) def = P(x S 1 )P (x S 2 ) P(x Sn ) (1) Note that we think of`as being relatively small (i.e.,`= O(log n)), and aim at having f n be univertible within time 2 n=O (1) . Thus, the hardness of inverting f n cannot be due to the hardness of inverting P. Instead, the hardness of inverting f n is supposed to come from the combinatorial properties of the collection of sets C = fS 1 ; :::; S n g (as well as from the combinatorial properties of predicate P).
The preferred implementation
Our preference is to have P be a xed randomly chosen predicate, which is hard-wired into the algorithm for evaluating f n . Actually, one better avoid some choices; see next section. (In casè = (log n) bad choices are rare enough.) In practice, we think of`in the range f7; :::; 16g, and so hard-wiring a (random) predicate de ned on f0; 1g`is quite feasible. The`-subsets will be determined by combinatorial constructions called expander graphs. At this point the reader may think of them too as being hard-wired into the algorithm. On input x 2 f0; 1g n , the algorithm for computing f n proceeds as follows:
1. For i = 1; ::; n, projects x on S i , forming the`-bit long string x (i) .
2. For i = 1; ::; n, by accessing a look-up table for P, determines the bit y i = P(x (i) ). The output is the n-bit long string y 1 y 2 y n . (Note that the n actions, in each of the above two steps, can be performed in parallel.)
An alternative implementation
An alternative to having P \hard-wired" to the algorithm (as above) is to have it appear as part of the input (and output). That is, letting hPi denote the 2`-bit string that fully speci es P, we have f 0 n (hP i; x) def = (hP i; P(x S 1 )P (x S 2 ) P(x Sn )) (2) Thus, P is essentially random since the inversion problem is considered with respect to a uniformly chosen input. This implementation is more appealing from a theoretical point of view, and in such a case one better let`= log 2 n (rather than`= O(1)).
Determining suitable collections
As hinted above, the collection of`-subsets, C = fS 1 ; :::; S n g, is to be determined by a suitable combinatorial construction known as expander graphs. The reason for this choice will become more clear from the analysis of one obvious attack (presented in Section 3.2). The speci c correspondence (between expanders and subsets) depends on whether one uses the bipartite or non-bipartite formulation of expander graphs:
Bipartite formulation: In this case one considers a bipartite graph B = ((U; V ); E), where (U; V ) is a partition of the vertex set, with jUj = jV j, and E U V is typically sparse. The expanding property of the graph provides, for every U 0 U (of size at most jUj=2), a lower bound on j?(U 0 )j ? jU 0 j (in terms of jU 0 j), where ?(U 0 ) = fv : 9u 2 U 0 s. In both cases, the lower bound provided by the expansion property on the size of the neighbor set is linear in the size of the vertex set; e.g., for the non-bipartite formulation it holds that j?(V 0 ) n V 0 j c jV 0 j for some constant c > 0 and every admissible V 0 .
Avoiding obvious weaknesses
Considering a few obvious attacks, we rule out some obviously bad choices of the predicate P and the collection C.
The choice of the predicate
We start by discussing two bad choices (for the predicate P), which should be avoided.
Linear predicates. It is certainly bad to use a linear predicate P (i.e., P( 1 `) = p 0 + Pì =1 p i i , for some p 0 ; p 1 ; :::; p`). Under a linear P, the question of inverting f n , regardless of what collection of subsets C is used, boils down to solving a linear system (of n equations in n variables), which is easy. Having a predicate P that is close to a linear predicate is dangerous too.
Horn predicates. Likewise, one should avoid having any predicate that will make the system of equations (or conditions) solvable in polynomial-time. The only other type of easily solvable equations are these arising from Horn formulae (e.g., an OR of all variables).
Degenerate predicates. The rest of our analysis refers to the collection of sets that determine the inputs to which the predicate P is applied. For this analysis to be meaningful, the predicate should actually depend on all bits in its input (i.e., be non-degenerated).
Good predicates. We believe that most predicates are good for our purpose. In particular, we suggest to use a uniformly chosen predicate.
The choice of the collection
Since the inverting algorithm can a ord to consider all preimages of the predicate P, it is important that the inversion of f n cannot be performed by interactively inverting P. To demonstrate this point, consider the case`= 1 and the collection fS 1 ; :::; S n g such that S i = fig. In this case the S i 's are disjoint and we can recover the preimage by inverting P on each of the bits of the image, separately from the others. For a less trivial example, consider the case where the collection C consists of n=2`sub-collections, each having 2`subsets of some distinct set of 2`elements. In this case, inversion can be performed in time O(n 2 2`) by considering each of these disjoint sets (of 2è lements) separately. Recall that we wish the complexity of inversion to be exponential in n (and not in`, which may be a constant).
In general, a natural inverting algorithm that should be defeated is the following: On input y = f n (x), the algorithm proceeds in n steps, maintaining a list of partially speci ed preimages of y under f n . Initially, the list consists of the unique fully-undetermined string n . In the rst step, depending on the rst bit of y = y 1 y n , we form the list L 1 of strings over f ; 0; 1g so that for every z 2 L 1 it holds that P(z S 1 ) = y 1 Note that the algorithm needs not proceed by the above given order of sets. In general, for every 1-1 permutation over n], we may proceed by considering in the ith step the set S (i) . Still, the complexity of this (generalized) algorithm is at least exponential in min max i We should thus use a collection such that Eq. (3) is big (i.e., bounded below by (n)).
Bad collections. It is a bad idea to have S j = fj + 1; :::; j +`g, since in this case we have j i j=1 S j j ? i `? 1 for every i. It also follows that we cannot use` 2, since in this case one can always nd an order so that Eq. (3) is bounded above by`? 1.
Good collections. An obvious lower bound on Eq. (3) is obtained by the expansion property of the collection C = fS j g, where the expansion of C is de ned as max k min I: jIj=k fj j2I S j j ? kjg (4) A natural suggestion is to determine the collection C according to the neighborhood sets of an expander graph. Loosely speaking, known constructions of expander graphs allow to let`be a small constant (in the range f7; :::; 16g), while guaranteeing that Eq. (4) is a constant fraction of n.
Concrete parameters for practical use
If we go for random predicates, then we should keep`relatively small (say,` 16), since our implementation of the function must contain a 2`-size table look-up for P. (Indeed,`= 8 poses no di culty, and`= 16 requires a table of 64K bits which seems reasonable.) For concrete security we will be satis ed with time complexities such as 2 80 or so. Our aim is to have n as small as possible (e.g., a couple of hundreds).
The issue addressed below is which expander to use. It is somewhat \disappointing" that for some speci c parameters we aim for, we cannot use the \best" known explicit constructions.
Below we use the bipartite formulation of expanders. By expansion we mean a lower bound established on the quantity in Eq. (4) . Recall that the time complexity is exponential in this bound.
Random construction. This yields the best results, but the \cost" is that with small probability we may select a bad construction. (The fact that we need to hard-wire the construction into the function description is of little practical concern, since we are merely talking of hard-wiring n ` log 2 n bits, which for the biggest n and`considered below merely means hard-wiring 20K bits.) Alternatively, one may incorporate the speci cation of the construction in the input of the one-way function, at the cost of augmenting the input by n ` log 2 n (where the original input is n-bit long). Speci c values that may be used are tabulated below. 1 degree (i.e.,`) #vertices (i.e., n) expansion error prob. The expansion was computed in a straightforward manner; the key component is to provide for any xed k and h an upper bound on the probability that a speci c set of k vertices has less than h neighbors.
The last column (i.e., error prob.) states the probability that a random construction (with given n and`) does not achieve the stated expansion. Actually, we only provide upper bounds on these probabilities.
Alon's Geometric Expanders 2]. These constructions do not allow`= O(log n), but rather is polynomially related to n. Still for our small numbers we get meaningful results, when using = q + 1 and n = q 2 + q + 1, where q is a prime power. Speci c values that may be used are tabulated below. 2 degree (i.e.,`) #vertices (i.e., n) Note that p = 5 and p = 13 are the only admissible choices for` 16. Larger values of q may be used, but this will only yield larger value of n.
Using the simple expander of Gaber{Galil 4] . Another nasty surprise is that the easy to handle expander of Gaber{Galil performs very poorly on our range of parameters. This expander has degree 7 (i.e.,`= 7), and can be constructed for any n = m 2 , where m is an integer. But its expansion is (c=2) n, where c = 1 ? p 3=4 0:1339746, and so to achieve expansion above 80 we need to use n = 1225. See table below:   2 The expansion is computed from the eigenvalues, as in 3]. Actually, we use the stronger bound provided by 2, Thm. 2.3] rather than the simpler (and better known) bound. Speci cally, the lower bounds in 2, Thm. 2.3] are on the size of the neighborhood of x-subsets, and so we should subtract x from them, and maximize over all possible x's.
(We use the stronger lower bound of n ?
(n?x)(`n+1) n+1+(n?`?2)x , rather than the simpler bound of n ?
n 3=2
x , both provided in 2, Thm. 5 Concluding remarks
Variations
One variation is to use either a speci c predicate or predicates selected at random from a small domain, rather than using a truly random predicate (as in the presentation above). The advantage of these suggestions is that the description of the predicate is shorter, and so one may use larger values of`. Two speci c suggestions follow: 1. Use the predicate that partitions its input into two equal length strings and takes their inner product modulo 2. That is, P(z 1 ; :::; z 2t ) = P t i=1 z i z t+i mod 2. In this case, the predicate is described without reference to`, and so any value of`can be used (in practice). This suggestion is due to Adi Shamir. 2. Use a random low-degree`-variant polynomial as a predicate. Speci cally, we think of a random`-variant polynomial of degree d 2 f2; 3g over the nite eld of two elements, and such a polynomial can be described by ?d bits. In practice, even for d = 3, we may use`= 32 (since the description length in this case is less than 6K bits). On the other extreme, for sake of simplifying the analysis, one may use di erent predicates in each application (rather than using the same predicate in all applications).
Directions for investigation
1. The combinatorial properties of the function f n . Here we refer to issues such as under what conditions is f n 1-to-1 or merely \looses little information"; that is, how is f n (X n ) distributed, when X n is uniformly selected in f0; 1g n . One can show that if the collection (S 1 ; :::; S n ) is su ciently expending (as de ned above) then the former distribution has min-entropy (n);
i.e., Pr f n (X n ) = ] < 2 ? (n) , for every 2 f0; 1g n . We seek min-entropy bounds of the form n ? O(log n).
2. What happens when f n is iterated? Assuming that f n \looses little information", iterating it may make the inverting task even harder, as well as serves as a starting point for the next item. 5 5 An additional motivation for iterating fn is to increase the dependence of each output bit on the input bits. A dependency of each output bit on all output bits is considered by some researchers to be a requirement from a one-way function; we beg to di er. 3 . Modifying the construction to obtained a \keyed"-function with the hope that the result is a pseudorandom function (cf. 5]). The idea is to let the key specify the (random) predicate P. We stress that this modi cation is applied to the iterated function, not to the basic one. 6 We suggest using (log n) iteration; in practice 3{5 iterations should su ce. Our construction is similar to a construction that was developed by Alekhnovich et. al. 1] in the context of proof complexity. Their results may be applicable to show that certain search method that are related to resolution will require exponential-time to invert our function Avi Wigderson, private communication]. This direction requires further investogation.
Inspiration
Our construction was inspired by the construction of Nisan and Wigderson 7] ; however, we deviate from the latter in two important aspects:
1. Nisan and Wigderson reduce the security of their construction to the hardness of the predicate in use. In our construction, the predicate is not complex at all (and our hope that the function is hard to invert can not arise from the complexity of the predicate). That is, we hope that the function is harder to invert than the predicate is to compute. 7 2. The set system used by Nisan and Wigderson has di erent combinatorial properties than the systems used by us. Speci cally, Nisan and Wigderson ask for small intersections of each pair of sets, whereas we seek expansion properties (of a type that cannot be satis ed by pairs of sets). Our construction is also reminiscent of a sub-structure of of the des; that is, the mapping from 32-bit long strings to 32-bit long strings induced by the eight S-boxes. However, the connection within input bits and output bits is far more complex in our case. Speci cally, in the des, each of the 8 (4-bit) output strings is a function (computed by an S-box) of 6 (out of the 32) input bits. The corresponding 8 subsets have a very simple structure; the i th subset holds bit locations f4(i ? 1) + j : j = 0; :::; 5g, where i = 1; :::; 8 and 32 is identi ed with 0. Indeed, inverting the mapping induced on 32-bit strings is very easy. 8 In contrast, the complex relation between the input bits corresponding to certain output bits in our case, defeat such a simple inversion attack. We stress that this complex (or rather expanding) property of the sets of input bits is the heart of our suggestion.
